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INTRODUCTION 
In April of 2007, thirty-one year old Valerie Stephenson attempted to file 
her federal income taxes for the first time.1  Unsure how to pay the small 
liability she owed, Valerie telephoned the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
to inquire how to proceed.2  However, in addition to receiving payment 
instructions, Valerie learned she had a massive liability of $77,865, which 
stemmed from her 1999 federal income tax return, which she had jointly 
filed with her ex-husband, Sean.3 
Valerie was extremely troubled by this news—during the marriage, Sean 
had sole control over the family’s finances.4  He did not allow Valerie 
access to the filing cabinet that contained the couple’s checkbook and 
financial documents, both of which required a key that only Sean 
possessed.5  When Sean needed Valerie to sign something, he placed the 
document in front of her and told her where to sign the document.6  Any 
time Valerie inquired about the contents of the document, Sean made 
threats of violence or mocked her for being unable to understand the 
document’s contents.7  Furthermore, Sean physically assaulted Valerie on 
several occasions, but she had remained in the relationship for fear of 
retaliation.8  With less than a high school education,9 no job,10 and over 
1. Stephenson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1048, 1050
(2011). 
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1048-49.
4. Id. at 1048.  According to the United States Tax Court, Valerie and Sean had
one joint checking account, but most of Valerie’s purchases had to be approved by 
Sean.  Id. at n.4. 
5. Id. at 1048.  According to the court, Valerie had to hide important personal
documents from Sean, such as her birth certificate and passport.  Id. at n.7 
6. Id. at 1048.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1049.  In 2003, Valerie had attempted to leave Sean.  Id.  However, Sean
threatened to kill her or himself if she left him.  Id.  Valerie testified that she was so 
frightened by the encounter, that she decided to remain married to Sean.  Id. 
9. Id. at 1048.  The alleged facts reveal that Valerie dropped out of high school
during her junior year in order to follow her ex-husband, Sean, out to California.  Id.  
Valerie also attempted unsuccessfully to earn her GED three times.  Id. 
10. Id. at 1050.  At the time Valerie learned about the 1999 liability, she had
divorced Sean and was renting a room in a friend’s house.  Id.  Since then, Valerie held 
four jobs and quit three of them.  Id.  Her current income is ten dollars an hour.  Id. at 
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$10,000 in unpaid rent, Valerie’s $77,865 tax liability appeared 
insurmountable. 
Unfortunately, Valerie’s case is not uncommon.  In fact, it is estimated 
that 50,000 individuals a year face income tax liabilities stemming from 
marriage.11  Furthermore, only twenty-two percent of these cases receive 
full relief.12  The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) provides that when a 
married couple signs a joint return, each spouse will be jointly and 
severally liable for the amount of tax due as well as any other resulting 
liabilities.13  As demonstrated by Valerie’s case, an “innocent spouse” will 
be liable for tax deficiencies belonging to her spouse, even if she had no 
knowledge of the liabilities or knew of the liabilities but feared to confront 
her spouse with them, as is quite common within the domestic violence 
context.14 
Prior to 1998, relief was available to innocent spouses but under rather 
restrictive conditions.15  In 1998, as part of the IRS Restructuring and 
Reform Act of 1998 (RRA), Congress enacted legislation that granted 
several exceptions to joint and several liability.16  Section 6015, known as 
the innocent spouse provision, offers three avenues of relief: (1) a release 
from all liabilities because the innocent spouse had no knowledge of any 
understatements or deficiencies;17 (2) partial liability if the spouses are now 
divorced or separated and the innocent spouse elects to have her liability 
n.18. 
11. Aiding Innocent Spouses from Joint Tax Liabilities, YOURABA, Sept. 2011,
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/youraba/201109article09.html; see 
also Jason Alderman, “Innocent Spouse Relief” Protects Against Tax Fraud, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2012, 1:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-
alderman/innocent-spouse-relief_b_1631665.html (stating that each year tens of 
thousands of people file for “Innocent Spouse Relief” with the IRS). 
12. Carla Fried, For “Innocent Spouses,” a Helpful Shift in I.R.S. Policy, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 11, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/business/yourtaxes/innocent-spouses-get-more-
relief-from-irs.html. 
13. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2013).
14. See Stephenson, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1052.
15. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-558, TAX ADMINISTRATION:
IRS’S INNOCENT SPOUSE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE IMPROVED; BALANCED
PERFORMANCE MEASURE NEEDED 03 (Apr. 2002); see also I.R.C. § 6013, repealed by 
Pub. L. 105-206, tit. III, § 3201(e)(1), 112 Stat. 740 (1998). 
16. I.R.C. § 6015 (2013).  Prior to 1998, there was only one way to obtain
innocent spouse relief under the now-repealed § 6013(e). RRA of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-206, 112 Stat. 685, 734-35 (1998).  The only way that an innocent spouse could 
obtain relief under § 6013(e) was in the instance of a substantial understatement of tax. 
Id. 
17. I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1)(C).
3
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limited to only items which would be allocable to her;18 and (3) 
discretionary equitable relief for those taxpayers who can demonstrate that 
full payment of the liability would be unfair because of the presence of 
factors like economic hardship and abuse.19 
While the creation of innocent spouse relief has provided tax assistance 
to many taxpayers, the factors currently used by the IRS and the United 
States Tax Court (Tax Court) often produce inequitable results when the 
taxpayer is a victim of domestic abuse.  Currently, the Code provides no 
guidance for how the Tax Court should assess the merits of a claim of 
abuse.20  Even more troubling is the fact that Tax Court opinions contain 
conflicting and often unattainable requirements for how taxpayers must 
corroborate abuse claims.  For instance, some judges will not uphold the 
claim unless a personal protection order has been granted;21 other judges 
deem the abuse “not serious” if the couple has joint custody of a child.22  
These judicially created requirements fail to account for the power and 
control dynamics of domestic abuse, even when the actual relationship 
between the parties has terminated. 
An empirical analysis was conducted on the sixty Tax Court cases where 
a spouse seeking innocent spouse relief also alleged the presence of 
domestic violence in the relationship.  This study examined whether and 
with what evidence the Tax Court upholds claims of domestic violence, 
and whether finding that domestic violence exists significantly impacts the 
taxpayer’s ability to attain equitable relief under §6015(f).  Finally, in lieu 
of the empirical results, two additional areas for expansion in the IRS’s 
newly proposed innocent spouse regulation are suggested, which would 
provide Tax Court judges with a list of non-exhaustive criteria to utilize in 
analyzing a claim of abuse.  The goal is to provide equitable tax relief to 
18. I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(i)(1).
19. I.R.C. § 6015 (f).
20. All that exists is Revenue Procedure Ruling 2003-61, which gives a list of
several factors that should be examined by the Tax Court when it assess claims for 
innocent spouse relief.  See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296.  
21. See Acoba v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 4002-05S, 2010 WL 1993610,
at *5 (T.C. May 19, 2010) (“The [order enjoined] Acoba from “assaulting, harassing, 
molesting or disturbing the peace of” petitioner . . . [b]ut there is no evidence to 
indicate whether the restraining order was the result of historical abuse or was a 
prophylactic measure taken by the court as an outcome of the divorce.”). 
22. See Sotuyo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 25692-10S, 2012 WL
1021306, at *5 (T.C. Mar. 27, 2012) (“Petitioners sought and received joint legal and 
shared physical custody of their daughter . . . and the family court did not order 
supervised visitation. . . .  Ms. Caro’s evidence of abuse does not rise to the level of 
abuse that would keep her from challenging the omission of income for fear of Mr. 
Sotuyo’s retaliation.”). 
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victims of domestic abuse who, because of the misconceptions of domestic 
violence in the present tax system, might otherwise be unsuccessful in their 
endeavors. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF INNOCENT SPOUSE LAW 
Reform in the Code has never come swiftly for married couples.  
Although spouses first faced joint and several liability beginning in 1938,23 
it was not until 1971, thirty-three years later, that any sort of relief was 
available to innocent spouses.24  Therefore, until 1971, a woman who 
lacked knowledge of her husband’s misstated income or who complied 
with his demands for her signature out of fear of retaliation was not only 
left without relief, but she was often on the hook for massive liabilities.25  
In 1998, three distinct provisions were created to provide innocent spouse 
relief—sections 6015(b), (c), and (f). For purposes of this Article, only 
subsection (f) will be considered. 
A. Equitable Relief Under § 6015(f) 
Subsection (f) grants a spouse relief from either a tax understatement or 
underpayment if “taking into account all of the facts and circumstances, it 
would be inequitable” to hold her liable.26  In order to assist IRS 
employees’ analysis of whether a requesting spouse should be entitled to 
equitable relief, the Commissioner prescribed a series of revenue procedure 
guidelines.27  According to Revenue Ruling 2003-61, a requesting spouse 
must satisfy seven threshold conditions before the Commissioner will 
consider a request for equitable relief.28  If these initial seven conditions are 
23. See Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 554, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447 (1939).
Scholars have posited that the reasons for creating joint return liability are unknown. 
See Richard C.E. Beck, The Failure of Innocent Spouse Reform, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 929, 934 (2006) (arguing that although some argue joint and several liability was 
thought to have been created due to the economic nature of the family, “[t]here is no 
evidence, however, that couples ordinarily share all or most of their property, much less 
that they ignore separate ownership to such an extent that they can be presumed 
indifferent to . . . tax liability”). 
24. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063 (1971) (codified
at I.R.C. § 6013(e)). 
25. For example, in the case of Scudder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
wife was held liable by the Tax Court for the assessed tax that was the result of her 
husband’s embezzling endeavors, of which she had no knowledge.  Scudder v. Comm’r 
of Internal Revenue, 48 T.C. 36, 41 (1967).  
26. I.R.C. § 6015(f).
27. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296.
28. Id.  The seven threshold conditions include: (1) IRC Sections 6015(b) and (c)
are not available, (2) there was a timely application for relief, (3) there is no evidence 
5
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satisfied, the requesting spouse can automatically qualify for equitable 
relief if she further meets three “safe harbor” factors: (1) she is legally 
separated or divorced from the non-requesting spouse at the time relief was 
requested; (2) she had no knowledge or reason to know at the time the 
return was signed that the non-requesting spouse would not pay the 
liability;29 and (3) she would suffer economic hardship if relief is not 
granted.30 
The requesting spouse must meet all three requirements in order to 
qualify for the safe harbor provision.31  When a requesting spouse fails to 
satisfy the safe harbor conditions, the Commissioner may determine 
through a balancing test whether equitable relief is appropriate.32  Revenue 
Ruling 2003-61 contains a non-exhaustive list of balancing factors to be 
utilized in deciding whether an innocent spouse should be granted equitable 
relief.33  Furthermore, the Ruling provides that “no single factor will be 
determinative in any particular case.”34  In addition to the three safe harbor 
factors, additional inquiries include whether the requesting spouse received 
a significant benefit from the nonpayment of taxes, was abused, or was in 
poor mental or physical health at the time of signing the relief.35 
When balancing the non-exhaustive list of factors, the IRS will 
determine whether the factor weighs in favor of relief, weighs against 
relief, or is neutral.36  The two factors that are the most applicable in the 
of fraudulent transfers of assets, (4) there is no evidence of disqualified assets 
transferred, (5) there is no evidence a fraudulent joint return was presented, (6) the tax 
is attributable to the non-requesting spouse, and (7) a joint return was filed.  Id. 
29. In determining whether the requesting spouse had reason to know, the court
inquires into (1) the requesting spouse’s level of education, (2) any deceit or 
evasiveness of the nonrequesting spouse, (3) the requesting spouse’s degree of 
involvement in the activity generating the income tax liability, (4) the requesting 
spouse’s involvement in business and household financial matters, (5) the requesting 
spouse’s financial expertise, and (6) any lavish expenditures.  Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 
2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2)(a)(iii)(C). 
30. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2)(a)(ii); see also Butner v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 136, 151 (2007).  To determine 
economic hardship, the IRS will use the factors provided in § 301.6343-1(b)(4) 
including (1) the requesting spouse’s age, employment status, history, ability to earn, 
and number of dependents, (2) the amount reasonably necessary for food, clothing, 
housing, medical expenses, and transportation, (3) costs of living in the geographic 
area, and (4) any other factor the requesting spouse presents.  
31. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.02(1)(a)-(c).
32. Butner, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) at 154.
33. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2)(a)-(b).
34. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2).
35. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2)(a)(C)(v).
36. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296 § 4.03(2)(a)(B).
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domestic violence context are whether the requesting spouse had 
knowledge of the liability and whether she can prove that she was abused 
throughout the relationship.  If the requesting spouse fails to prove that she 
lacked knowledge or had no reason to know, this factor will weigh against 
relief; however, if she cannot prove that she was abused, this factor will be 
neutral and not weigh against relief.37 
B. Duress Versus Abuse and the Knowledge Requirement 
Although duress and abuse require many of the same pieces of evidence, 
they differ when the events occur.  Duress relates to the moment the return 
is signed and exists when a spouse forces her spouse to sign a tax return.38  
Although not explicitly defined in the Code,39 the Tax Court provided some 
guidance in the 1966 case of Stanley v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue.40  In Stanley, the Tax Court found that, although the requesting 
spouse had suffered long-term physical abuse at the hands of her husband, 
she failed to show that she signed the tax return under duress.41  The 
Stanley court stated, “Not only must fear be produced in order to constitute 
duress, but the fear must be a cause inducing entrance into a transaction . . . 
without which the transaction would not have occurred.”42  Thus, although 
the requesting spouse lived in constant fear of her husband, the requisite 
causal link between fear and signing the return was not established.43 
On the contrary, in Hiramanek v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the 
requesting spouse was viciously beat by her husband after she refused to 
sign the couple’s tax return.44  The wife had recorded in her diary numerous 
instances of threats against her life, physical assault, and verbal abuse 
leading up to the evening when her husband demanded that she sign the 
return.45  The next day, when presented with the return, which still had an 
incorrect deduction, the wife signed out of fear of another violent attack.46  
37. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2)(b)(i)-(ii).
38. Brown v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 51 T.C. 116, 119-20 (1968).
39. The Tax Court has only held “[d]uress may exist not only when a gun is held
to one’s head while a signature is being subscribed to a document.  A long-continued 
course of mental intimidation can be equally effective, and perhaps more so, as a form 
of duress.”  Brown, 51 T.C. at 119-20 (1968). 
40. See Stanley v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 45 T.C. 555, 564 (1986).
41. Id. at 565-66.
42. Id. at 563.
43. Id. at 565-66.
44. Hiramanek v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 546, 550
(2011). 
45. Id. at 549.
46. Id. at 550.
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The court analyzed two prongs in finding that she signed the return under 
duress: (1) that she was unable to resist her spouse’s demands that she sign 
the return, and (2) that the requesting spouse would not have signed the 
returns without the constraint the spouse placed on her.47  If duress is 
proven, courts hold that no joint return was filed, thereby relieving the 
coerced spouse of the joint liability.48 
If the IRS rejects the duress argument, however, then the requesting 
spouse must establish that she is entitled to innocent spouse relief from 
joint liability.49  Abuse not amounting to duress differs from duress in two 
key aspects: (1) abusive conduct is viewed as being less severe, and (2) the 
abusive conduct occurred either before or after the return was signed.50  
Although abusive conduct may not amount to duress, it can still weigh in 
favor of relief and also mitigate the knowledge requirement.  For instance, 
in Venables v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Tax Court initially 
held that because the requesting spouse knew her family was experiencing 
financial difficulty at the time she signed the return, the knowledge factor 
weighed against relief.51  However, the Tax Court acknowledged that her 
husband exerted financial control over her by threatening her with physical 
harm every time she asked to make a withdrawal from the couple’s joint 
checking account.52  The Venables court thus concluded that the financial 
and physical abuse the requesting taxpayer suffered mitigated the 
knowledge requirement and she ultimately was granted relief.53  The abuse 
factor will be discussed in more detail below in relation to what pieces of 
evidence the court examines when assessing a claim of abuse, as well as 
the potential biases and inconsistencies that often emerge in the analyses. 
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY
Scholars have estimated that since the RRA was enacted, the IRS has 
received over 1,000 applications for innocent spouse relief per week.54  
47. Id. at 554-55; see also Brown, 51 T.C. at 119.  Important to note is that the Tax
Court considers the totality of the circumstances under a “wholly subjective standard.” 
Id. 
48. Id. at 119.
49. See Stergios v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1057, 1061
(2009). 
50. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2)(a)(ii).
51. Venables v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 22068-08S, 2010 WL 1980316,
at *6 (T.C. May 18, 2010). 
52. Id. at *1.
53. Id. at *7.
54. See Kari Smoker, Comment, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998: Expanded Relief for Innocent Spouses—At What Cost?  A 
8
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss4/2
2014] (IN)EQUITABLE RELIEF 833
One issue that has consistently baffled both the IRS and the Tax Court is 
the interplay between domestic violence and innocent spouse cases.55  In 
Nihiser v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,56 Judge Holmes expressed 
his frustration with how courts handle allegations of domestic violence, 
stating that “[t]his is not a terribly well developed corner of tax law, and it 
is not one in which we can really get much help by looking at detailed 
regulations or the ordinary canons of construction.”57  Similarly, scholars 
have noted that, in general, there has been a lack of empirical research into 
innocent spouse cases and even less investigation into how Tax Court 
judges respond to allegations of domestic abuse.58 
In 2011, Professor Stephanie McMahon from the University of 
Cincinnati College of Law conducted an empirical study of 444 litigated 
claims for innocent spouse relief between 1998 and 2011.59  Professor 
McMahon looked at the factors listed under Revenue Ruling 2003-61 that 
the Tax Court examines in an innocent spouse case.60  This Article goes 
into more depth on the issue of abuse and examines the fifty-six cases 
where the requesting spouse claimed she was abused by the non-requesting 
spouse during the marriage.61  It evaluates the differences between cases 
where the abuse claim was sustained versus denied in order to ascertain 
what factors courts are evaluating when a claim of abuse is presented.62 
Feminist Perspective, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 2045, 2088 (1999); Steve Johnson, The 1998 
Act and the Resources Link Between Tax Compliance and Tax Simplification, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1044 (2003). 
55. See Fed Stokeld, Taxpayer Advocate Blasts IRS’s Handling of Innocent Spouse
Case, TAX NOTES, Jan. 31, 2011, 
http://www.woodporter.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/Taxpayer_Advocate_Blasts_IRS
_Handling.pdf (describing how National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson criticized the 
IRS for “display[ing] an astonishing ignorance about what happens to people in 
abusive relationships”]. 
56. Nihiser v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1531, 1531 (2008).
57. Id. at 1541.
58. See Michael Bommarito et al., An Empirical Survey of the Populations of U.S.
Tax Court Written Decisions, 30 VA. TAX. REV. 523, 526 (2011); Daniel M. Schneider, 
Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory Interpretation in Federal Tax 
Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325, 325 (2001). 
59. Stephanie Hunter McMahon, An Empirical Study of Innocent Spouse Relief:
Do Courts Implement Congress’s Legislative Intent?, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 629, 635 
(2012) [hereinafter McMahon Study]. 
60. Id. at 631.
61. Id. at 694-95.
62. Id. at 695.
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A. Brief Explanation of the McMahon Study 
The cases used in this study include all recorded tax decisions in the 
Westlaw database handed down between November 16, 2000, and March 
30, 2013, that included the words “innocent spouse,” “tax,” “6015,” and 
“abuse.”  The 444 cases used for the McMahon Study were narrowed down 
using the Westlaw search terms to those fifty-six instances where the 
spouse seeking relief alleged that domestic violence occurred during the 
marriage.  Each case was coded for a variety of information and compiled 
into a spreadsheet, including information about the parties (gender, 
education, employment history, etc.) and their relationship (type of abuse, 
evidence of abuse, role in family finances, etc.).  While the purpose of the 
McMahon Study was to examine patterns within cases,63 this Article takes 
on the additional task of examining the variables utilized by the Tax Court 
to determine whether to uphold or reject an abuse claim. 
This study focuses exclusively on cases handled by the Tax Court as this 
court is where a majority of taxpayers seeking innocent spouse relief appeal 
the IRS’s denial of their claims.64  It is important to note that the study does 
not include every innocent spouse case heard by the Tax Court where abuse 
was alleged.  Much like the McMahon Study, only so much information 
can be gathered from cases located on research databases.  Many cases are 
unpublished or settled before litigation,65 and many others never reach 
litigation because requesting spouses often do not have the resources to 
appeal an IRS decision. 
B. The Requesting Spouse: Profile of a Battered Taxpayer 
One of the many misconceptions of domestic violence is the expectation 
that a victim fit a particular stereotype.66  This stereotype is often a woman 
belonging to a lower socioeconomic class who is perhaps a racial minority 
or a recent immigrant.67  The fear many scholars share is that judges 
63. Id. at 648.
64. Id. at 648, 650-51.  According to the McMahon Study, 89.2% of all appeals
from IRS decisions were brought before the Tax Court.  Id.  The remaining percentages 
of cases were split between the Court of Claims, District Courts, and Circuit Courts. 
Id. 
65. See Bommarito et al., supra note 58, at 530 (noting that “not all cases that are
filed result in a written opinion. . . .  Some are settled before a judgment can be 
reached, and others result in an unwritten bench opinion”). 
66. Cynthia Willis Esqueda & Lisa A. Harrison, The Influence of Gender Role
Stereotypes, the Woman’s Race, and Level of Provocation and Resistance on Domestic 
Violence Culpability Attributions, 53 SEX ROLES 821, 822 (2005); Zanita E. Fenton, 
Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in Gender 
Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 6, 10 (1998). 
67. See Alana Bowman, A Matter of Justice: Overcoming Juror Bias in
10
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inexperienced in handling domestic violence matters will view a victim’s 
claim with less credibility if she does not conform to a specific 
stereotype.68  Thus, to prove that there is no stereotypical victim, it is 
necessary to explore the diverse profiles of domestic violence victims who 
seek innocent spouse relief from the Tax Court.  Furthermore, it is also 
essential to investigate whether, despite the lack of a single victim profile, 
Tax Court judges are still awarding relief based on stereotypes. 
1. Gender of the Requesting Spouse
The RRA was originally crafted to provide relief to female taxpayers
who were unknowing victims of liabilities attributable to their spouses.69  
According to a 1998 Congressional Conference Report, 90% of the 
innocent spouse cases brought before the passage of the RRA were by 
women.70  Similarly, the McMahon Study found that women continue to 
make up the majority of requesting spouses, with 338 women, as opposed 
to 59 men bringing cases before the Tax Court, representing 85% of the 
cases.71  The following chart illustrates the number of women as compared 
to men who have sought innocent spouse and alleged they were abused by 
their spouse. 
Prosecutions of Batterers Through Expert Witness Testimony of the Common 
Experiences of Battered Women, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 219, 242 (1992) 
(explaining that jurors in criminal cases have certain expectations of who the victim is 
and victims who do not fit within a particular stereotype are bewildering to the jurors). 
Similarly, there are additional false impressions as to the identity of the batterer.  See 
James Martin Truss, The Subjection of Women . . . Still: Unfulfilled Promises of 
Protection for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 St. Mary’s L.J. 1149, 1167 
(1995).  
68. See MARY ANN DUTTON, NAT’L ONLINE RES. CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, UPDATE OF THE “BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME” CRITIQUE 4 (Aug. 2009), 
available at http://www.vawnet.org/Assoc_Files_VAWnet/AR_BWSCritique.pdf; 
Wendy McElroy, Domestic Violence: Behind the Stereotypes, IFEMINISTS.COM (Nov. 
10, 2004), http://www.ifeminists.net/introduction/editorials/2004/1110.html 
(“[S]tereotypes that have defined the issue of domestic violence are inadequate and 
they are hurting victims who do not conform”); Martha Shaffer & Nicholas Bala, The 
Role of Family Courts in Domestic Violence, in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: STRATEGIES FOR COMMUNITY INTERVENTION 171, 175 (Peter G. 
Jaffe ed., 2004). 
69. See 144 Cong. Rec. S7657 (July 8, 1997); S. REP. NO. 89-144, at 7649 (1998)
(CONF. REP.) (“All too often women are stuck holding bills of their ex-husbands, only 
then finding out that their ex-spouse had not legally filed a tax return.”). 
70. 144 Cong. Rec. S76430-02 (July 8, 1998); see also Stephen Zorn, Innocent
Spouses, Reasonable Women and Divorce, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 421, 424 (1996). 
71. McMahon Study, supra note 59, at 662 (noting that women bring
approximately 84.3% of the trial cases and 88% of the appellate cases). 
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Gendered Relief 
Brought Trial Case Won Trial Case 
Wife Husband Wife Husband 
55 5 26 [47.27%] 2 [40%] 
Much like the McMahon Study, 91.67% of the requesting taxpayers who 
alleged abuse were women.72  Women have won 93% of the total taxpayer 
victories where abuse was alleged and, according to the McMahon Study, 
89.50% of victories in general.73  Thus, innocent spouse relief in general 
and allegations of abuse in particular appear to be gendered within the tax 
context. 
It is not quite clear how these numbers correlate with allegations of 
domestic abuse in other circumstances.  Studies that have examined the 
gendered nature of domestic abuse have shown extremely inconsistent 
results.74  Furthermore, it is important to note that many members of the 
judiciary, in both family courts and tax courts, lack an understanding about 
domestic violence and its seriousness. Oftentimes, judges and legal 
personnel make gender-biased assumptions to the effect that women falsely 
raise abuse issues for tactical gain.75 Thus, in analyzing the likelihood that a 
woman, because of her gender, is likely to gain innocent spouse relief, it is 
crucial to be aware of the persistent biases that exist in the legal field. 
Furthermore, it is important for judges to not overlook men when 
72. Id. McMahon pointed out that Congress classified innocent spouse relief as a
women’s issue. Id. In McMahon’s study, wives sought innocent spouse relief in 85.4 
percent of the total cases, thus corroborating Congress’s claim. Id. Similarly, this study 
further perpetuates the idea that it is mostly wives who are seeking innocent spouse 
relief.  
73. Id.
74. For example, according to a study conducted by the National Coalition Against
Domestic Violence, 85% of domestic violence victims are women.  CALLIE MARIE 
RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME DATA BRIEF: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE,
1993-2001 (2003), available at 
http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf. However, 
according to a 2010 national survey by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, more men than women were victims of domestic 
abuse and over 40% of the severe physical violence was directed at men.  NAT’L CTR.
FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY (Nov. 2011), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf. 
75. For instance, “[w]omen who raise concerns about a violent partner . . . are
unlikely to be believed because lawyers and judges tend to overemphasize the 
possibility that false allegations are being used to further . . . claims.” Peter G. Jaffe, et 
al., CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY, 17 (2003). 
12
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analyzing their claims of abuse.  As noted by many victim advocates, men 
are largely silent on issues of domestic abuse because of gender roles and 
social stereotypes that hold that men are supposed to be the physically 
stronger and more dominant partner in the relationship.76  Furthermore, 
men may be less inclined to report instances of abuse because of fear of 
ridicule from judges, law enforcement personnel, and the public in 
general.77  Therefore, when a man presents a claim of abuse during an 
innocent spouse proceeding, there is the chance that he may not have 
corroborating documents due to the fact that he did not report the abuse or 
that his claim was not taken seriously by police officers or judges because 
of his gender. Conversely, there also needs to be an awareness that men 
who are abusers may in fact falsely raise accusations of domestic abuse for 
a tactical gain in an innocent spouse proceeding.78  Thus, many men 
winning protective orders or seeking innocent spouse relief are themselves 
abusers who intimidated their partners into being silent or dominated and 
controlled their partners in such a way that they did not even recognize that 
they were being abused.  Lawyers, tax court judges, and legal personnel 
need to gain an increased awareness of the multitude of different dynamics 
and scenarious that domestic violence plays in an innocent spouse case and 
the possibility that the individual seeking relief may in fact be the abuser. 
2. Marital Status of the Requesting Spouse
The Tax Court gives great weight to an individual’s marital status at the
time relief is requested.79  A spouse is required to be separated or divorced 
before she can attain relief under §6015(c).80  If the requesting spouse is 
76. Ruth S., Men: The Overlooked Victims of Domestic Violence, DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE STAT. (May 16, 2012), http://domesticviolencestatistics.org/men-the-
overlooked-victims-of-domestic-violence; DENISE A. HINES, OVERLOOKED VICTIMS OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: MEN (2011), available at 
http://www.clarku.edu/faculty/dhines/May%202011%20Canada%20roundtable%20pre
sentation.pdf (conducting a study of 302 instances of abuse where men between the 
ages of eighteen and fifty-nine were the victims). 
77. See Domestic Violence, CLARK CNTY. PROSECUTING ATT’Y,
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/domviol/men.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) 
(“Men often suffer physical abuse in silence because they are afraid that no one will 
believe them or take them seriously.  In fact, some men who do try to get help find that 
they are mocked and ridiculed.”). 
78. For instance, scholars have noted that “genuine batterers routinely denounce
their accuser and commonly retaliate with accusations that their partners are actually 
the aggressors, are unfit, or are systematically brainwashing children” Peter G. Jaffe, et 
al., CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY, 17 (2003). 
79. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, § 4.03(2)(a)(ii).
80. I.R.C. § 6015(c).
13
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still married, she may be able to obtain relief under §6015(f), but her 
marital status will weigh against her in the Tax Court’s balancing test.81  
Unlike “neutral” factors that will not count against the requesting spouse, 
marital status is given significant weight and is often determinative of 
whether relief is granted.82  The following chart illustrates how the Tax 
Court evaluates the requesting spouse’s marital status and whether there is 
a correlation between the status and relief. 
Marital Status of Those Seeking Relief 













4 0 6 2 
Divorced 4 0 38 3




0 0 0 0 
Marital Status of Winning Taxpayers 













1 0 2 1 
Divorced 1 0 17 1




0 0 0 0 
As expected, most couples were married (76.67%) when they filed their 
tax returns but divorced (68.3%) when the requesting spouse sought relief. 
Interestingly, 16.67% of requesting spouses filed for relief when widowed. 
81. I.R.C. § 6015(f).
82.  § 6015(f). 
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This information contrasts a bit with the McMahon Study, where only 13% 
sought relief when widowed and 25% sought relief while still married to 
the non-requesting taxpayer.83  Here, only 2% were still married to the non-
requesting spouse when they filed for relief.  Women who were divorced at 
the time they filed for innocent spouse relief had a 45% rate of obtaining 
relief.  This statistic contrasts with the 30% chance women who were 
widowed or separated had for relief.  It is necessary to further explore how 
domestic violence may impact a woman’s marital status and when she 
chooses to file for relief.  Additionally, in lieu of the relationship between 
marital status and domestic violence, judges may need to revise how they 
weigh the marital status factor in order for it to not serve as an inequitable 
barrier to relief. 
i. Widow Status Provides Safety from Retaliation for Abuse Victims.
When compared to the McMahon Study, the rise in the number of 
women who brought abuse claims after their spouse was deceased may be 
attributed to the very nature of the abusive relationship.  As noted by 
scholars, domestic abuse does not always end with the termination of the 
relationship.84  Instead, abusers still have access to their victims through 
joint custody of children or, ironically, shared marital debt.85  It has also 
been stressed that a woman faces an increased risk of violence or homicide 
in the time immediately following her separation or divorce from her 
batterer.86  Filing for innocent spouse relief after a separation or divorce 
may actually incite the batterer to retaliate.  Therefore, it is not surprising 
83. McMahon Study, supra note 59, at 663 (noting that women bring
approximately 84.3% of the trial cases and 88% of the appellate cases). 
84. Orly Rachmilovitz, Bringing Down the Bedroom Walls: Emphasizing
Substance Over Form in Personalized Abuse, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 495, 
501 (2008) (“[W]hen the relationship comes to an end, the abuser may still exploit the 
relationship, continuing to access the victim, carrying on the abusive and controlling 
behavior.”); Lauren A. Kent, Comment, Addressing the Impact of Domestic Violence 
on Children: Alternatives to Laws Criminalizing the Commission of Domestic Violence 
in the Presence of a Child, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1337, 1364 (2001) (arguing that in 
situations of joint custody, abusers still have access to their victims even after divorce, 
which allows them to continue abuse).  
85. See Vicki Coggins, Domestic Violence—Using Children to Control, STANLY
NEWS & PRESS (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://thesnaponline.com/opinion/x2136342002/Domestic-violence-using-children-to-
control. 
86. The rate of attack against women divorced from their husbands is twenty times
higher than that of married women.  Further, it is estimated that 73% of emergency 
room visits and up to 75% of calls to the police for domestic violence incidents occur 
after separation.  See Teresa Meuer & Kathryn Webster, Effects of Domestic Abuse on 
Child Witnesses, 1997 WILEY FAM. L. UPDATE § 9.6, at 219. 
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that many women do not feel safe filing for innocent spouse relief until 
after their abuser is deceased. 
The Tax Court needs to be increasingly cognizant of the increased risk of 
violence following the termination of the relationship.  According to this 
study, women who were widowed at the time of filing for innocent spouse 
relief only had a 30% chance of obtaining relief.  In Lepordo v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,87 for instance, the Tax Court did not 
uphold a woman’s allegation of abuse nor grant her relief because her 
husband was deceased and “not available to defend himself against the 
abuse allegations or to otherwise verify them.”88  Although the judge may 
have been trying to prevent a potentially false claim of abuse, he did not 
consider whether the spouse did not seek relief while her husband was alive 
because she feared the consequences. 
Current Tax Court case law also reveals that judges are disinclined to 
grant relief when the victim signed the contentious return after the 
relationship had ended.  For example, the court in O’Neil v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revue did not find Mrs. O’Neil’s statement that she feared 
retaliation if she did not sign the return to be credible because she was 
legally separated from her husband when the return was signed.89  Despite 
Mrs. O’Neil’s statement that she was threatened with “trouble” if she did 
not sign the return, the court chose not to grant relief.90  Once again, 
although there is an objective rule that examines the marital status of the 
taxpayer, judges may need to view this factor with more scrutiny than in 
instances where abuse has not been alleged. 
ii. The Presence of Violence May Prevent a Woman from Obtaining a
Divorce. 
An additional problem with the marital status factor is that courts do not 
consider why a taxpayer may still be married to the spouse at the time relief 
is sought, especially in instances where abuse has been alleged.  In Sriram 
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the requesting spouse was still
married to her husband at the time she filed for innocent spouse relief.91  
The court failed to give weight to her argument that her cultural practices 
prevented her from divorcing her husband.92  The requesting spouse in 
87. Lepordo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 12911-06S, 2008 WL 65176, at
*1 (T.C. Jan. 7, 2008).
88. Id. at *9.
89. O’Neil v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 724, 733 (2012).
90. Id.
91. Sriram v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1482, 1487 (2012).
92. Id. at 1490.
16
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Wilson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue was prevented from divorcing 
her abusive husband because she lacked the financial means to obtain a 
divorce.93  In fact, her husband deliberately withheld finances from her so 
that she could not seek legal assistance in both tax and divorce-related 
matters.94 
This judicial oversight is particularly problematic when judges are 
considering whether to give weight to a taxpayer’s claim for abuse.95  For 
instance, judges have maintained that abuse is not “serious enough” when 
the couple was still married, shared joint custody of their children, or 
maintained regular contact with one another.96  Tax Court judges are not 
the only professionals who give in to stereotypes—domestic relations 
mediators and family court judges awarding custody of children may also 
lack the requisite knowledge about the complicated nature of domestic 
abuse.  Numerous studies show the frequency to which alleged abusers are 
awarded sole or joint custody of minor children.97  Therefore, it should not 
automatically count against a requesting spouse in an innocent spouse case 
if she is still married to her abuser or shares children with him. 
3. Domestic Abuse Victims’ Education and Work Experience
A final stereotype of the domestic violence victim is that the wife is from
a lower socioeconomic class and is both controlled by and reliant upon her 
abusive husband.98  An appeal from the IRS’s denial of innocent spouse 
relief to the Tax Court requires a significant amount of time and 
93. Wilson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1552, 1554 (2010).
94. Id.
95. See infra Part II(C)(1)-(2).
96. See, e.g., Bruen v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 400, 403
(2009) (“Moreover, in spite of these allegations, the family court allowed Ms. Bruen 
and Mr. Bruen to live together with their children for 9 months after their divorce.”). 
97. Joan Zorza, How Abused Women Can Use the Law to Help Protect Their
Children, in END THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO CHILDREN OF
BATTERED WOMEN 147, 147-69 (E. Peled ed., 1995); Amy Levin & Linda G. Mills, 
Fighting for Child Custody When Domestic Violence Is at Issue: Survey of State Laws, 
48 SOCIAL WORK 463 (2003) (“There is ample evidence that judges fail to take the 
violence seriously and award sole or joint custody to wife beaters.  Many judges 
believe that women either exaggerate men’s violence or otherwise deliberately alienate 
their children from fathers during divorce to gain a custody advantage.”); see also M.B. 
Liss et al., Domestic Violence and Child Custody, in BATTERING AND FAMILY
THERAPY: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 181, 181-83 (M. Hensen ed., 1993). 
98. International Women’s Day: 10 Misconceptions About Domestic Violence
(Mar. 8, 2013, 2:50 PM) available at http://metro.co.uk/2013/03/08/international-
womens-day-top-10-misconceptions-about-domestic-violence-3533055/; Domestic 
Violence Myths, BOSTON UNIVERSITY, available at 
http://www.bu.edu/police/prevention/domestic_violence_myth.htm 
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resources.99  Thus, the numbers here may not present a completely accurate 
picture of the victims seeking relief.  Nevertheless, the charts do help to 
dispel some victim stereotypes, while simultaneously raising some 
interesting questions regarding the batterer’s control. 
Education Level of Petitioning Spouse 
Requesting Relief Winning Relief 
















2 10 12 1 6 7 (58%) 
Post-
Graduate 
0 2 2 0 1 1 (50%) 
Employment 
Requesting Relief Winning Relief 












4 16 20 0 5 5 
(31%) 
The charts demonstrate that victims seeking innocent spouse relief have 
varying levels of education and that there does not seem to be any 
99. For instance, it takes at least six months after a petition to the Tax Court is
filed for a case to be heard.  See About the Court, US TAX COURT (2011) 
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about.htm.  Small cases often take a year to decide and 
regular cases take much longer.  Id.  The problem with small tax cases is that taxpayers 
are unable to appeal these decisions.  Id.  Additionally, interest also accrues on the 
unpaid tax balance while the proceedings are pending.  Id. 
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correlation between an individual’s education and her prospects for relief. 
When compared with the results of the McMahon Study, however, the 
numbers are interestingly inverted.  Importantly, this study details 
situations where the individual requesting relief also alleged she suffered 
from domestic abuse. The McMahon study, by contrast, also included cases 
where the requesting spouse did not allege the presence of domestic abuse. 
According to the McMahon Study, the number of women with college 
degrees seeking innocent spouse relief were double that of women with 
only a high school education.100  However, women in the McMahon Study 
with college degrees were only 32% likely to obtain relief versus the 45% 
of women with a high school education who obtained relief.101 
Another difference between women filing for innocent spouse relief in 
general and those alleging domestic abuse is the role they have in providing 
for their families.  Scholars have noted that abusers oftentimes control their 
victims by forbidding them from working outside the home in an attempt to 
isolate them.102  In this study, in over 60% of the cases where an individual 
seeking innocent spouse relief stated she experienced domestic abuse, the 
abuser was the primary wage earner in the family.  In fact, other studies 
have shown that there is a 50% chance that a battered woman will drop 
below the poverty line when she leaves her abuser.103  However, the 
statistics in this study stand in stark contrast to those in the McMahon 
Study, where a mere 36% of non-requesting spouses were the primary 
wage earners.104  Many studies have painted conflicting pictures as to 
educational background and independent financial resources of victims and 
perpetrators of domestic violence.105  Thus, it appears that the educational 
 100.  McMahon Study, supra note 59, at 666.  104 of the individuals petitioning for 
innocent spouse relief had at least a college degree, while thirty-two had only a high 
school education.  Id. 
101.  Id. 
 102.  What Is Domestic Violence?, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (last updated Mar. 2013), 
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm; ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED
WOMEN KILL 1862 (1987). 
 103.  Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and 
Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 368 (1996). 
104.  McMahon Study, supra note 59, at 667. 
 105.  For example, in her study entitled Gender, Status, and Domestic Violence: An 
Integration of Feminist and Family Violence Approaches, Dr. Kristin Anderson of 
Western Washington University found that “men who have both higher and lower 
educational resources than their female partners are more likely to perpetrate violence 
acts than those possessing the same level of education as their female partners.” 59 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 655, 664 (August 1997). Dr. Anderson concluded that 
socioeconomic status “is not a central mechanism through which race, education, age, 
and cohabiting status are associated with domestic violence.” Id. Conversely, in the 
empirical analysis conducted in For Women, Breadwinning Can Be Dangerous: 
19
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background and socioeconomic status of both the victim and abuser are 
relevant to the presence of abuse, but other factors such as culture, race, 
and the individuals’ gender ideologies must also be considered.106 
Nevertheless, Tax Court judges appear to be cognizant of the financial 
dilemmas that plague a victim who not only faces a massive tax liability, 
but also must be able to economically provide for herself when she was 
previously dependent upon her abuser. 
C. Definitions of Abuse 
Tax Court judges must not only be aware of the ways in which victims 
of abuse seeking tax relief differ from other taxpayers, but they must also 
work towards understanding how to properly weigh allegations of abuse 
within an innocent spouse case.  Just as there are problematic victim 
stereotypes, misconceptions also exist about what exactly constitutes abuse.  
Many individuals have the misconception that domestic abuse frequently 
involves physical violence and police intervention.107  Thus, when a 
requesting spouse alleges she has suffered from mental or emotional abuse, 
judges may be less inclined to grant relief because the type of abuse does 
not conform to their misconceptions.  Similarly, a woman who alleges 
physical violence but fails to provide evidence of police reports or medical 
documents may have a difficult time proving the abuse element in Tax 
Court.108 
The Tax Court’s narrow interpretation as to what constitutes abuse 
recently garnered media attention.  Certified Public Accountant Peter 
Reilly wrote a December 2012 article for Forbes Magazine discussing the 
Tax Court’s controversial O’Neil v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
decision.109  In O’Neil, Allison, the requesting spouse, alleged that her 
Gendered Resource Theory and Wife Abuse, Drs. Maxine P. Atkinson and Theodore N. 
Greenstein of North Carolina State University and Dr. Molly Monahan Lang of 
Baldwin-Wlallace College concluded that “low-income husbands . . . are no more nor 
less likely to abuse their wives than are high-income husbands.” 67 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 1137, 1145 (Dec. 2005). However, the authors noted that domestic violence may 
be premised more on the husband’s gender ideology as opposed to earning potential. 
Id. at 1146. For instance, “[w]hen men accept an ideology that defines masculinity in 
relationship to being the breadwinner, and their wives earn a significant portion of 
couple income, violence might be used to reassert dominance.” Id.  
106.  See sources in previous footnote. 
 107.  In many cases, this popular mythology, created and retold by the media, is 
extremely damaging to the prosecution, particularly when there is only one incident of 
violence in a new relationship, such as a punch to the jaw, or where the defendant 
claims that she was fighting back. 
108.  See infra Part II(C)(2)(a)-(b). 
109.  Peter J. Reilly, Tax Court Not Quick to Find Abuse in Innocent Spouse Case, 
20
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss4/2
2014] (IN)EQUITABLE RELIEF 845
husband “emotionally and psychologically” bullied her and threatened her 
with “trouble” if she did not sign the return.110  Judge Holmes held that 
Allison did not make a sufficient showing of abuse because she did not 
present any documentation of the abuse.111  Reilly interviewed attorney 
Cathy Brennan on her reaction to the O’Neil decision.112  Brennan replied 
that the Tax Court took too narrow a view of abuse and that it “ignore[d] 
the dynamics of an abusive relationship . . . [how] the abuser dominates all 
aspects of his partner’s life and uses all tactics available to him to control 
her.”113  In order to adequately address the needs of domestic violence 
victims in the tax context, it is essential to explore where the Tax Court’s 
misconceptions exist. 
1. Introduction to Abuse in Innocent Spouse Cases
Many practitioners have hypothesized that there is a strong correlation
between whether a judge upholds an abuse claim and whether a judge 
ultimately grants tax relief.114  An inquiry must be made whether the 
opposite is also true.  The following charts document the number of cases 
since 1998 where abuse was alleged, the success of those claims, and 
whether innocent spouse relief was granted. 










Number of Cases 60 40 20 
Taxpayer Wins 29 11 18 
FORBES MAGAZINE (Dec. 18, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2012/12/18/tax-court-not-quick-to-find-abuse-
in-innocent-spouse-case; see also O’Neil v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 104 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 724, 733 (2012). 
110.  O’Neil, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) at 733. 
 111.  Id. (stating that “Allison appears not to have had a happy marriage with 
Michael . . . [b]ut we have no basis to find “bullying” or intimidation here—much less 
more substantial abuse.”). 
112.  See Reilly, supra note 110.  
113.  Id. 
114.  See Aiding Innocent Spouses from Joint Tax Liabilities, supra note 11. 
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In 66.67% of the cases in which abuse was alleged, the judge found that 
there was no abuse.  Furthermore, tax practitioners’ hypotheses are 
correct—there is in fact a correlation between the judicial recognition of 
abuse and an ultimate grant of relief.  In 90% of the cases where abuse was 
found, the taxpayer was ultimately granted equitable relief.  On the 
contrary, if the taxpayer’s abuse claim was dismissed, there was only a 
27.5% chance that the judge would grant relief.  The strong correlation 
between a finding of abuse and ultimate tax relief necessitates a greater 
understanding of the dynamics of domestic abuse as well as consistent 
application of judicially created factors in analyzing whether the abuse 
claim should be upheld to ensure equitable relief. 
2. Criteria for a Finding of Abuse
The sharp decline of abuse claims that were upheld in 2012 may mean
that judicial interpretation of what constitutes a successful allegation is 
shifting.  Although initially designed to give judges discretion in handling 
the unfamiliar issue of domestic abuse, the lack of both a clear definition of 
abuse as well as a non-exhaustive list of criteria have proved 
problematic.115  The only guidance for judges comes from Revenue Ruling 
2003-61, which requires that the requesting spouse was a victim of abuse 
prior to the time the return was signed and that, because of the abuse, she 
 115.  Nihiser v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1531, 1539 (2008). 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines abuse as “physical or mental maltreatment, often 
resulting in mental, emotional, sexual, or physical injury.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
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did not challenge any items on the return for fear of retaliation.116  This 
Revenue Ruling grants Tax Court judges too much discretion and provides 
little guidance in determining an issue with which they have no experience. 
Furthermore, the criteria enunciated by some judges are either ignored or 
misapplied by other judges, thus creating an ambiguous and often 
unachievable standard. 









4 10 2 
Upheld 
Claims 
3 10 5 
Reasons Provided for Dismissing Abuse Claims 
Reasons Mentioned in Case 
Dismissing Abuse 
Specificity Issues 5 
Return Signed Post-Separation, “Could 
Not Be Abused at the Time of Signing,” 
and/or “Did Not Sign Out of Fear” 
5 
Substance Abuse Addiction Not Enough 2 
Did Not Corroborate 18 
Did Not Mitigate Knowledge 
Requirement 
1 
Behavior Did Not Rise to Level of Abuse 8 
i. The Need for Corroboration
Judges have held that a claim of abuse must be corroborated to weigh in 
favor of the requesting spouse.117  However, the amount of evidence 
necessary to provide corroboration is unclear.  For instance, in Collier v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the requesting spouse insisted she 
116.  Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296. 
 117.  See Pullins v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 136 T.C. 432, 454 (2011); 
Venables v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 22068-08S, 2010 WL 1980316, at *7 
(T.C. May 18, 2010); Bruen v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 400, 
410 (2009); Fox v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 731, 736 (2006); 
Bright v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 3839-04S, 2005 WL 2444050, at *4 (T.C. 
Oct. 4, 2005); Rooks v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 11874-02S, 2003 WL 
21350037, at *4 (T.C. June 11, 2003). 
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suffered constant verbal and mental abuse from her husband during their 
marriage.118  Mrs. Collier introduced testimony from a friend who 
witnessed the verbal lashings as well as testimony from a psychologist who 
treated her for depression.119  The Tax Court, however, found her friend’s 
testimony to be “conclusory and lacking in any specificity” and the 
psychologist’s testimony to not “establish[]” abuse.120  Consequently, Mrs. 
Colllier’s abuse claim was denied.121  Conversely, in Chadwick v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Tax Court held that, although the 
only evidence of physical and emotional abuse was Mrs. Chadwick’s own 
testimony, it was “credible” enough to establish that she was abused during 
her marriage.122 
Although sufficient corroborating evidence is necessary to protect 
against frivolous allegations, Tax Court judges have failed to recognize that 
some victims cannot produce corroborating evidence because of the very 
nature of the abuse.  Domestic violence is well-known to be a common, yet 
under-reported, crime.123  Estimates provide that victims report only 14.5% 
of serious assaults to the police.124  Nevertheless, a spokesperson from the 
New South Wales Women’s Refuge Movement Working Party Inc. 
described the misconceptions that still existed, stating that “[t]he word of a 
woman making an allegation of violence . . . without documented evidence 
is treated with disbelief, without providing opportunities for corroboration 
by other means.”125  Many victims fail to disclose instances of abuse for 
fear of retaliation, endangering her children, and shame.126  Additionally, 
118.  Collier v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1790, 1799 (2002). 
119.  Id.  
120.  Id. 
 121.  See id. at 1791 (finding that Ms. Collier failed to carry her burden of showing 
abuse). 
 122.  Chadwick v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 4991-04S, 2005 WL 2649124, 
at *18 (T.C. Oct. 17, 2005). 
 123.  See SHANNAN M. CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2003, at 1 (2003) (showing only 
48% of all violent victimizations being reported). 
 124.  KRISTIN A. KELLY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 3 
(2003). 
 125.  New South Wales Women’s Refuge Movement Working Party Inc, 
Submission FV 188 (June 25, 2010); see also K. Johnstone, Submission FV 107 (June 
7, 2010). 
 126.  See Barbara R. Barreno, In Search of Guidance: An Examination of Past, 
Present, and Future Adjudications of Domestic Violence Asylum Claims, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 225, 243 (2011) (“Domestic violence is viewed as a “hidden problem,” and its 
victims are often “invisible” to society because they choose not to disclose their 
situations for such reasons as fear, shame, and the social stigma attached to abuse.”); 
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many victims do not want to bring claims of abuse out of the private sphere 
into a courtroom in emotional and intrusive trials.127  Thus, many who seek 
innocent spouse relief will not have a paper trail of police reports or 
personal protection orders. 
Some victims, such as the requesting spouse in Collier v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue, may only have a friend or family member who can 
provide some corroboration of abuse.  While some judges do not give 
weight to this form of corroboration, others do.  In Thomassen v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the court upheld a claim of abuse that 
was corroborated by the requesting spouse’s children and family friends, 
even though no other evidence was presented.128  Judges need to be mindful 
of the discrepancies in their criteria.  Furthermore, judges need to be 
cognizant that some requesting spouses may not even have family members 
or friends to corroborate the allegations.  A key tactic utilized by abusers is 
isolation to instill dependence and cut the victim off from outside 
resources.129  Thus, abusers often isolate victims from friends and family 
members, thus preventing the victims from confiding instances of abuse in 
these individuals.130 
Furthermore, as noted by some Tax Court judges, victims do not check 
the box on the Innocent Spouse Relief Request Form 8857 indicating that 
they have been abused.131  By law, the IRS is required to contact the 
Leigh Goodmark, Telling Stories, Saving Lives: The Battered Mother’s Testimony 
Project, Women’s Narratives, and Court Reform, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 709, 744 n.186 
(2005) (“[W]omen are actually reluctant to disclose abuse to legal system 
professionals, particularly in custody cases, because of fear of both the abuser and the 
system’s perception of women who make such claims.”) (citing Martha Albertson 
Fineman, Domestic Violence, Custody, and Visitation, 36 FAM. L. Q. 211, 222-23 
(2002)).  
 127.  Joy M. Bingham, Protecting Victims by Working Around the System and 
Within the System: Statutory Protections for Emotional Abuse in the Domestic Violence 
Context, 81 N.D. L. REV. 837, 843 (2005); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NAT’L VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY (July 
2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf (“Most victims of 
intimate partner violence do not consider the justice system an appropriate vehicle for 
resolving conflicts with intimates.”). 
 128.  Thomassen v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397, 1409 
(2011).  
 129.  Coercive Control, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 166, 169 (Nicky 
Ali Jackson ed., 2007). 
130.  Id. 
 131.  See Pullins v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 136 T.C. 432, 453 (2011) (noting 
that the requesting spouse failed to “check the box” that she had been abused during the 
relationship). 
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requesting spouse’s partner or former partner for the opportunity to 
intervene in the case, even in instances of domestic violence.132  Although 
the IRS does not disclose personal information to the alleged abuser during 
the pendency of the innocent spouse petition, if the case is appealed to the 
Tax Court, all of this information will become available to the abuser.133  
Thus, a woman may be dissuaded from filing to obtain relief or alleging 
abuse because of the presence of her abuser.134 
ii. Police Intervention and Personal Protection Orders
An interesting consideration is whether the presence of a police report 
would provide sufficient corroboration for an abuse claim to be successful. 
Courts have reached divergent results.  For instance, in McKnight v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the requesting spouse alleged numerous 
instances of physical violence in the relationship with her deceased 
husband.135  The police were called to the home on two separate incidents 
following violent altercations.136  The court acknowledged that, although 
Mrs. McKnight did not want to press criminal charges against her husband 
or seek medical treatment for fear of the consequences to her husband, her 
claim for abuse was sufficiently corroborated by the presence of the police 
report.137  Conversely, in Sotuyo v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the 
requesting spouse also introduced a police report into evidence that detailed 
an incident of domestic violence where the wife was the victim.138  The 
court, however, dismissed the abuse claim and held that “[the wife’s] 
evidence of abuse does not rise to the level of abuse that would keep her 
from challenging the omission of income for fear of [her husband’s] 
retaliation.”139 
 132.  IRS Innocent Spouse Questions and Answers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Innocent-Spouse-Questions-&-Answers (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2014).  However, to protect the requesting spouse’s privacy, the IRS will not 
disclose her personal information.  
 133.  Id.  Under Tax Court Rule 27(d)(1), the requesting spouse can request a 
protective order from the court to require redaction of personal information. 
 134.  See Evidence of Family Violence: Difficulties in Giving Evidence, 
AUSTRALIAN L. REFORM COMM’N, 
http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/18.%20Evidence%20of%20Family%20Violence/d
ifficulties-giving-evidence (citing Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of 
Family Violence Laws: Report § 11.1 (2006)). 
135.  McKnight v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 76, 85 (2006). 
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. 
138.  Sotuyo v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 25692-10S, 2012 WL 1021306, at 
*5 (T.C. March 27, 2012).
139.  Id.; see also Ladehoff v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 16814-10S, 2012 
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Additionally, when a woman reports an incident of domestic violence, 
“the belief that it is a private matter continues to play a significant role. 
The refusal of the police to arrest offenders and the reluctance of judges to 
sentence them has been widely documented.”140  Thus, many judges do not 
consider instances where a woman tries to obtain assistance or create a 
paper trail of her abuse, but her efforts are rebuffed by law enforcement 
and the justice system. 
iii. Verbal and Mental Abuse
Tax Court judges have expressed hesitancy in upholding an abuse claim 
when no physical abuse was alleged.141  They fear that these verbal, mental, 
and financial abuse allegations naturally “spring from the dissolution of 
troubled marriages, and there is an obvious incentive to vilify the non-
requesting spouse.”142  Below is a chart that describes the various types of 
abuse that requesting spouses bring. 







18 4 11 1 24 
Claims 
Upheld 
6 0 1 0 12 
In Nihiser v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the court posed the 
question of whether “psychological mistreatment” without the presence of 
physical abuse could be enough.143  The requesting spouse in Nihiser never 
alleged that her former spouse physically abused her.144  Instead, she stated 
that her husband verbally abused her, suffered from a drug addiction, and 
WL 612501, at *3 (T.C. Feb. 27, 2012) (holding that the evidence of battery contained 
in two police reports “does not rise to the level of abuse that would keep him from 
challenging the treatment of the items on the return for fear of his ex-wife’s 
retaliation”). 
140.  KELLY, supra note 127, at 3. 
 141.  See Nihiser v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1531, 1540 
(2008) (noting that “[w]e are aware of the danger that requesting spouses, in trying to 
escape financial liability, may easily exaggerate the level of nonphysical abuse”). 
142.  Id. 
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. at 1541. 
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oftentimes threatened to commit suicide.145  The Nihiser opinion was the 
first time the Tax Court recognized the various ways batterers could exert 
control over their spouses without physically harming them—isolation, 
threatening to commit suicide, engaging in drug abuse, and using degrading 
language, to name a few.146  The court did not choose to make these various 
factors dispositive, but rather referred to them as “objective indications” 
that abuse was present in the relationship, and not “just a deviation from 
the ideal of marital harmony.”147 
iv. The Interplay of Financial Abuse
A final issue that continues to perplex the Tax Court is whether financial 
control could potentially be its own “category” of abuse, including whether 
it should provide circumstantial evidence of other types of abuse and 
whether it could mitigate other factors such as whether the requesting 
spouse had “knowledge” of the misstatements on the income tax return.  As 
evidenced below, abuse victims are often unaware of their tax and financial 












Finances & Seeks 
Relief 




2 3.27% 1 50% 
Husband Controls 
Finances & Seeks 
Relief 




30 49% 19 63% 
Separate Finances 1 1.64% 0 0% 
Both Controlled 24 39.34% 9 37.5% 
145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 1542 (quoting MARY ANN DOUGLAS, The Battered Woman Syndrome, in 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY
VIOLENCE 39 (Daniel Jay Sonkin ed., 1987)). 
147.  Id. 
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Had No Conception of 
Finances 
Number of Cases 17 14 
Number Won 11 9 
Winning Percentage 65% 64% 
In Bishop v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the requesting spouse, a 
college-educated accountant, was denied access to the couple’s bank 
account by her spouse.148  She was only given a weekly allowance to pay 
for the couple’s groceries.149  Although Mrs. Bishop did not allege that her 
ex-husband physically abused her, the Tax Court upheld her claim of 
mental and emotional abuse in part because of the evidence of financial 
control.150  Several years prior, however, the Tax Court had dismissed a 
requesting spouse’s abuse claim even though the facts were very similar to 
the Bishop case.  In Smith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Tax 
Court disbelieved the requesting spouse’s argument that her ex-husband 
had controlled all of the family’s finances prior to their divorce.151  Part of 
the Tax Court’s denial of her claim stemmed from the fact that because she 
was a nurse and “neither uneducated nor intelligent . . . we do not believe 
that she would have been . . . oblivious about the family resources from 
which the taxes could have been paid.”152  The judicial reluctance to accept 
the presence of abuse is very troubling, especially since many women can 
produce evidence of financial abuse but may not have corroborating 
evidence of physical abuse.  Thus, the recognition of the seriousness of 
financial abuse as a form of control in and of itself, as well as an 
underlying precursor of other types of abuse, could be crucial in permitting 
more victims, especially those that lack corroborating evidence of abuse, to 
obtain innocent spouse relief. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
On January 6, 2012, the IRS issued a proposed revenue procedure that 
148.  Bishop v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 7595-06S, 2008 WL 852028, at 
*2-4 (T.C. Mar. 31, 2008).
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. at *18. 
151.  Smith v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue , 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 963, 967 (2001). 
152.  Id. at 969. 
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would alter the way innocent spouse relief requests would be handled under 
Section 6015(f).153  Notice 2012-8, which explains the proposed regulation, 
focuses in part on how the presence of abuse may impact a spouse’s 
willingness and ability to challenge misstatements on a return.154  This 
proposed regulation is a step in the right direction, but more guidance must 
be provided on what criteria judges should examine when they choose 
whether to uphold or dismiss a claim for abuse.  In particular, many victims 
do not possess vital documents, such as police reports or personal 
protection orders that many judges essentially require.155  In addition to the 
beneficial changes proposed in Notice 2012-8, there needs to be further 
emphasis on what circumstantial evidence judges should consider in their 
investigation. 
A. Considering Family Finances and Economic Circumstances Throughout 
the Relationship 
As explained by this Article, there is no single profile of the average 
domestic abuse victim seeking tax relief.156  The education level of the 
various taxpayers, for example, are exceptionally diverse.  Nevertheless, 
despite the victim’s education and employment qualifications, a persistent 
theme in the data was the economic dependence and financial control 
exerted by the alleged abusive spouse.157  In over half of the cases (53%), 
the non-requesting spouse had absolute control over the family finances.158  
Many requesting spouses additionally reported that they were either given a 
strict allowance by the alleged abuser or had no conception of the couple’s 
financial situation whatsoever.159  What is especially telling about these 
cases is that requesting spouses were only making allegations of physical, 
verbal, or emotional abuse—not financial abuse per se.160  Thus, the 
presence of financial control seems to underlie many of the allegations of 
abuse. 
Currently, there is no regulation that considers how the presence of 
financial control may serve as circumstantial evidence for a claim of abuse. 
In instances where a requesting spouse cannot provide documented 
 153.  This proposed revenue procedure, if adopted, would supersede Rev. Proc. 
2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296. 
 154.  Examination of Returns and Claims for Refund, Credit, or Abatement: 
Determination of Correct Liability, 26 C.F.R. § 601.105 (2013). 
155.  See discussion supra Part II(C)(1)-(2). 
156.  See discussion supra Part II(B)(3). 
157.  See discussion supra Part II(C)(2)(d). 
158.  See discussion supra Part II(C)(2)(d). 
159.  See discussion supra Part II(C)(2)(d). 
160.  See discussion supra Part II(C)(2)(c). 
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evidence of abuse to sufficiently corroborate her allegations, courts should 
consider the presence of financial abuse as a factor.  The same controlling 
behavior that manifests itself in financial abuse could naturally carryover 
into other types of behavior. 
Additionally, the presence of financial abuse can be used to supplement 
many of the other factors under Revenue Ruling 2003-61.  For instance, 
one of the factors entitled “knowledge or reason to know” requires that the 
requesting spouse “did not know and had no reason to know of the item 
giving rise to the deficiency.”161  Financial abuse coupled with allegations 
of other types of abuse could singlehandedly provide enough evidence for 
the taxpayer to be successful on this knowledge factor.  If the victim of 
domestic violence does not have any knowledge of the couple’s finances 
and faces some form of abuse whenever she asks about financial matters, 
she should be granted relief under this factor.  Thus, the proposed 
regulation should include a section discussing this suggestion and the 
underlying rationale. 
B. Instances of Inconsistent Allegations in Various Proceedings: 
Considering the Period After the Separation 
An additional consideration that perplexes many judges is why women 
do not allege the presence of domestic violence in divorce proceedings or 
even on their innocent spouse request forms, but do so later when the case 
is before the IRS or Tax Court.162  Although judges fear the woman may be 
lying about or exaggerating the abuse, judges fail to recognize that a 
woman may have been afraid to disclose this information at an earlier 
proceeding or unwilling to handle the legal repercussions of the disclosure 
at the time.163  Therefore, an addition to the proposed regulation might 
provide for a situation where a woman’s abuse claim has not been 
consistent across her innocent spouse or other legal proceedings.  In 
analyzing whether the taxpayer’s election to allege abuse is credible, judges 
should consider factors such as (1) the length of time between legal 
proceedings where abuse was not alleged and the current innocent spouse 
case, (2) whether the non-requesting spouse resides in close proximity to 
the victim or whether he has relocated, (3) whether the victim and abuser 
are in new personal relationships, and (4) whether there are children from 
the marriage. 
A victim of abuse who is separated from her abuser by time, physical 
distance, and legal obligations may no longer be in fear of her former 
161.  Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296. 
162.  See discussion infra Part II(C)(1). 
163.  See discussion infra Part II(C)(1). 
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spouse retaliating against her if she alleges that the relationship was 
plagued by abuse.  Furthermore, scholars have detailed the potential 
psychological traumas that accompany an abusive relationship—namely, a 
woman’s inability to realize the direness of her situation or her attempts to 
make excuses for her spouse.164  Thus, a victim may not initially consider 
her situation to be one of direness or even abuse; she may need some time 
apart from the batterer’s control to actually come to terms with the nature 
of the relationship.  Thus, a requesting spouse should not be penalized 
when she maintains she was not abused in one instance but alleges abuse 
during her innocent spouse case. 
CONCLUSION 
Although innocent spouse relief has been in existence for a number of 
years, judges are still grappling with many of the intricacies of the factors 
promulgated by Revenue Ruling 2003-61.  Domestic abuse is a concept not 
normally addressed by Tax Court judges and tax practitioners alike. Even 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the IRS, and various Tax Court 
judges have acknowledged that they are not well-versed in the complexities 
of domestic violence.165  Thus, more needs to be done to ensure that 
requesting taxpayers who are victims of domestic abuse have the ability to 
attain equitable relief or, perhaps more significantly, that these individuals 
are not barred from relief simply because the presiding judge does not 
understand the intricacies of a relationship plagued by domestic violence. 
 164.  MARGI LAIRD MCCUE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 21
(2008) (“Denial and minimization enable a woman to live with what is happening and 
to avoid feelings of terror and humiliation.”); PETER G. JAFFE ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 35 (2003) 
(“Because secrecy, denial, and cover-up are all integral threads in the fabric of 
violence, clinically validating a history of domestic violence requires sophisticated and 
sensitive interviewing skills.”).   
 165.  See, e.g., Bernie Becker, Advocate: IRS Needs Greater Understanding of 
Domestic Violence, HILL (Jan. 11, 2012, 8:25 PM) (stating that IRS employees need 
more of an understanding of abuse victims). 
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